ICSA E-Newsletter
Vol. 5, No. 1
February 2006
Divergent European Cult Policies: A Reply to Henri de Cordes
Richard Singelenberg
See
article
and
reply to this comment by Henri de Cordes.
In his plea for a common European policy on ‘sectarian
deviations’, Henri de Cordes, chairman of IACSSO/CIASSO (the Belgian
governmental information and advice centre on harmful sectarian organizations)
sketches the development of the European supra-national procedures and includes
examples from national administrations. His aim is the establishment of a
European observatory on sects, the very institution that was recommended by the
Council of Europe in 1999 but failed to be implemented. Unfortunately, de
Cordes’ discussion suffers from several shortcomings. Basic errors, crucial
omissions, and invalid argumentation have resulted in a treatise that is
substandard from a professional point of view.
Some basic errors can be found in the part where the author
discusses the European governmental institutions. The aim of the Council of
Europe extends beyond “exclusively (…) human-rights protection,” as asserted by
the author. It also addresses standardization of legal practices among member
states as well as promoting the awareness of a shared identity that cuts across
European cultures. Since 1989, the CoE has been particularly active in providing
democratic know-how in former Soviet controlled areas in Eastern-Europe. Next,
according to de Cordes, the “(European) Court (of Human Rights) cannot reform a
decision of a national jurisdiction.” It certainly can, since a judgment of the
ECHR is binding and member states are under an obligation to comply with them,
which may result in the amendment of national legislation. Finally, though it
appears that this discussion is not meant as an academic paper, it might have
been helpful to the reader if the author would have added proper references to
the several quotes from ECHR sources.
The Netherlands
Concerning The Netherlands, de Cordes attributes the
non-existence of a national policy on cult-related activities to the so-called “poldermodel”:
“According to this principle, when a problem arises, a dialogue, in a spirit of
tolerance, must be established. Eventually, the problem disappears.”
If all problems could be settled this easily! Clearly, this
impression is simplistic. It is also erroneous. The Dutch term “poldermodel”
relates to the economic realm. It points to corperative economy where unions,
employers, and government attempt to reach a consensus on important
socio-economic issues, such as social security, employment, reduction of
financing deficit, etc. As such, the concept has no bearing on the cult issue.
Rather, in addition to the allegedly traditional Dutch
tolerance towards deviant beliefs and practices, the historical phenomenon of
“pillarization”—the co-existence of multiple socio-political blocks which can be
distinguished by a specific ideological/religious worldview—has prevented a
sharp polarization between conventional ideas and novel religions. (For an
extensive discussion, see Kranenborg 1994, Singelenberg 2004). These structural
phenomena notwithstanding, the increase of new religious movements in Dutch
society, in conjunction with controversial practices, not only elicited
widespread alarming media reports, it also resulted in the emergence of SOS, a
cult-awareness group. This organization contributed to convincing the government
to initiate an investigation on the possible dangers of new religious movements.
The outcome was the study of Tobias Witteveen (1984), who made clear that “new
religious movements are no real threat to public mental health.” This conclusion
flatly contradicted public opinion which was convinced that cults were a danger
to individual and society.
De Cordes quotes extensively from this study, adding that
“it (…) guided the Dutch authorities in their attitude toward sectarian
organizations—namely, the policy of having no policy.” It certainly influenced
national cult policy, but de Cordes fails to mention the preceding and
influential study from 1982 by renowned sociologist Paul Schnabel (the present
director of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis). Basically,
Schnabel’s conclusions, albeit from a different perspective, were similar to
Witteveen’s: “In general, new religious movements in The Netherlands cannot be
considered a danger to public mental health.” Also, in the early 1980s,
psychologists from Nijmegen University had published several case studies on new
religious movements (See, for example, van der Lans 1981). They did not point to
any dangers that could emanate from being associated with these groups.
Therefore, de Cordes’ suggestion that Witteveen’s study was
the result of the “poldermodel” or conformity “to the social consensus on
new religious movements to receive his PhD” is unfounded and insinuating. As
sketched above, this “social consensus on new religious movements” was far from
obvious in view of SOS’s activities and negative media accounts. Witteveen’s
study not only included new data but also elaborated on previous research. De
Cordes implies that somehow scores of investigators were governed by political
motivations rather than by sound research. Though this would be an interesting
line of inquiry, the author fails to substantiate this suggestive claim. As it
stands now, de Cordes’ analysis of the historical situation in The Netherlands
is nothing short of an ill-founded caricature. SOS’s failed attempts to
establish a rehabilitation centre, since no clientele was ever presented, led to
its disbandment in 1991 because of dwindling membership figures. This
development may indicate the appropriateness of the Dutch “policy of having no
policy.”
The Pan-European Scenery
In addition to The Netherlands, de Cordes presents examples
from policies by the governments of Vatican City, United Kingdom, France,
Switzerland, and Belgium. On Vatican City, he notes “(it) is not a significant
example of a member state of the E(uropean) U(nion).” Apparently, de Cordes
fails to realize that Vatican City is not a EU member state. Further, the
paragraph “Central and Eastern European Countries” (or former Soviet controlled
areas) includes the remark that “several (of these) countries) adopted very,
even too, generous legislation in the field of religious freedom.” It is unclear
what de Cordes means by “very” or “too generous legislation” and which countries
he has in mind. In contrast, the author ignores the multiple accounts on
violations of human rights, specifically directed at members of minority
religions, in former communist countries as reported by the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations High
Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR), and the International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights. For example, the latter noted that many
countries in that region have failed to adopt adequate legislation on the right
to conscientious objection on religious grounds. It is amazing that de Cordes
ignores the recent gruesome persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Caucasian
republic of Georgia and the inertia of the state that has permitted this reign
of terror (Ochs 2002). This, and other information is easily accessible through
the internet websites of these and other organizations. Moreover, several edited
volumes from academic sources pay attention to the, at times, detrimental
position of cult members and adherents of minority religions in the former
Soviet controlled regions (e.g., Lucas & Robbins 2004; Davis & Besier 2002;
Richardson 2004). Either de Cordes is unaware of these publications—which is
hardly imaginable in view of his professional position—or he prefers to ignore
their existence.
On the supra-national level, de Cordes briefly sketches the
development of legislation on sectarian movements in the Council of Europe. On
the European Parliament, however, he neglects to refer to the so-called
Berger-report from 1997, which concluded that “nothing imposes or justifies the
creation of a European policy against cults or the creation of a specialized
European institution” (Luca 2004:64). Besides the temporary surveillance of the
Church of Scientology by German state security services in the 1990s, France,
Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Switzerland are the only countries who
institutionalized some form of governmental policy on cult observance. De Cordes
has also included the United Kingdom. However, the British charity organization,
INFORM, does not function as a governmental watchdog like Belgian IACSSO/CIASSO
and French MIVILUDES. His remark of commonalities between these institutions is
therefore somewhat misleading, since, even a superficial glance at the aims and
policy of INFORM reveals basic differences in terms of research methods and
methodological perspectives when compared to IACSSO/CIASSO and MIVILUDES (Barker
1993, 1995: 141-143). Basically—as the author himself notes—“Great Britain has
no specific policy in the field of sectarian deviations.” Neither have the
overwhelming majority of European countries, convinced as they are that existing
legislation will suffice to deal with violations of the law, including those
that involve religious movements and their membership. It appears that de
Cordes’ plea for a common European policy is devoid of historical, social, and
political realism. As Luca notes on France:
Most European countries seem to
adapt themselves more rapidly than France to the new circumstances of the
developing religious market. Is it because their religious traditions prepare
them better then French traditions, or because they resist better than French
the development of the market? (…) Cults seem perceived as strongly threatening
to France’s own identity, perhaps because this identity is already in a crisis
situation. (Luca 2004: 70)
De Cordes may wonder if he finds it appropriate to include
Belgium in this consideration.
References
Barker, E. (1989, 1995) New Religious Movements. A
Practical Introduction London: HMSO
Barker, E. (1993) “Will the Real Cult Please Stand Up? A
Comparative Analysis of Social Constructions of New Religious Movements”, pp.
193-211 in D.G. Bromley & J.K Hadden (eds) Religion and the Social Order. The
Handbook on Cults and Sects in America Vol 3, Part B. Greenwich CT: JAI
Press
Davis, D.H. & G. Besier (eds) (2002) International
Perspectives on Freedom and Equality of Religious Belief Waco: J.M. Dawson
Institute of Church-State Studies
Kranenborg, R (1994) “The Anti-Cult Movement in the
Netherlands: Un Unsuccessful Affair”, pp. 221-236 in A. Shupe & D.G. Bromley (eds)
Anti-Cult Movements in Cross-Cultural Perspective. New York: Garland
Publishing
Lans, J. van der (1981) Volgelingen van de goeroe.
Hedendaagse religieuze bewegingen in Nederland. Baarn: Ambo
Luca, N. (2004) “Is There a Unique French Policy of
Cults?”, pp. 53-72 in Richardson J.T.
Lucas, P.C & T. Robbins (eds) (2004) New Religious
Movements in the 21st Century. Legal, Political, and Social
Challenges in Global Perspective New York: Routledge.
Ochs, M. (2002) “Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Georgia Today”, in Religion, State & Society 30(3) pp 239-276
Richardson, J.T. (ed) (2004) Regulating Religion. Case
Studies from Around the Globe New York: Kluwer Academic
Schnabel, P. (1982) Tussen stigma en
charisma. Nieuwe religieuze bewegingen en geestelijke volksgezondheid.
Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.
Singelenberg, R. (2004) “Foredoomed to Failure. The
Anti-Cult Movement in the Netherlands”, pp. 213-219 in Richardson J.T.
Witteveen, T. (1984) Overheid en nieuwe religieuze
bewegingen. The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij
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