ICSA E-Newsletter
Vol. 5, No. 1
February 2006
Preventing Cultic/Sectarian Deviations in Europe: Policies That
Differ
Henri de Cordes
See
Comment
by Richard Singelenberg and
reply by Henri de Cordes.
Abstract
In Europe, the human rights issue is not perceived as a
priority in terms of harmonization, in spite the subscription by Member States
of the Council of Europe to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. The freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in
particular, is too intimately linked to the history and the culture of each of
these countries to be harmonized in a common policy vis-à-vis the dangers which
threaten this freedom. Examination of the practices of the major European
countries reveals some trends regarding prevention of (cultic) sectarian
deviations; on one level, there is a refusal to recognize the problem; while on
another level, certain states speak of a fight against these deviations; whereas
in between, the option of vigilance is preferred.
The
European Institutions
European
human-rights policy is characterized by the
existence of two institutions: 1) the Council of
Europe, which encompasses the forty-six member
states that signed the European Convention for
the Protection of Humans Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 1950 and 2) the European Union (EU),
which is heiress to the European Economic
Community created by the Treaty of Rome of 1957.
While the Council of Europe mainly exerts
its influence in the field of human-rights
protection, the EU’s focus includes respect for
human rights together with the social, economic,
and cultural policies entrusted to the EU by the
member states.
The
defence of human rights is one of the founding
principles of the EU. After having adopted the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, the EU reiterated in the preamble to its
constitutional treaty a declaration of human
rights that essentially respects the principles
stated in the 1950 Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights.
The Council of Europe
Article
9 of the European Convention affirms the right
of every person to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. This right includes,
in particular, freedom to change his or her
religion or belief. Article 9 provides
explicitly that the freedom to express one’s
religion or beliefs can be subject to legal
restrictions insofar as these restrictions are
necessary “for public safety, protection of the
order, health, or public morals, or with the
protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.” Further protection is ensured by
article 17 — Prohibition of Abuse of Rights:
…nothing
in this Convention may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group, or person any
right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.
The Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
The
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
which consists of representatives of the
national parliaments of the member states, was
brought to examine the
question of the freedom of religion in
connection with public authorities:
·
In 1984, the
European Parliament adopted a resolution in this
regard.
·
In 1992, the
Parliamentary Assembly voted on the Hunt Report,
a recommendation regarding sects and new
religious movements. The European Parliament
agreed, in particular, that it was in favour of
“information [...] on the nature and activities
of sects and new religious movements [that]
should also be widely circulated to the general
public. Independent bodies should be set up to
collect and circulate this information….”
·
In 1999, in its
recommendation 1396 entitled Religion &
Democracy, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe states that
It is not
up to politicians to decide on religious
matters. As for religions, they must not try to
take the place of democracy or grasp political
power; they must respect the definition of human
rights, contained in the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the rule of law.
·
Also in 1999,
in its recommendation 1412, Illegal
Activities of Sects, the Assembly called on
the governments of member states, where
necessary, to set up or support independent
national or regional information centres on
groups of a religious, esoteric, or spiritual
nature. Furthermore, the Assembly recommends
that the Committee of Ministers
1.
Provide, where necessary, for specific action to
set up information centres on groups of a
religious, esoteric, or spiritual nature in the
countries of central and eastern Europe in its
aid to programmes for those countries; and
2. Set
up a European observatory on groups of a
religious, esoteric, or spiritual nature to make
it easier for national centres to exchange
information.
Although, because of budgetary limitations, the
Committee of Ministers did not respond to the
request to create a European observatory,
recommendation 1412 can be regarded as the
foundation upon which European policies
concerning the fight against sectarian
deviations are developed.
The European Court of
Human Rights
The
European Court of Human Rights, located in
Strasbourg, is an international institution
whose judges control how the signatories of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
apply its provisions.
Even if the Court cannot
reform a decision of a national jurisdiction,
the influence of its jurisprudence is important
for the national magistrates who, in some
states, must directly apply the provisions of
the Convention.
The
judgments of the Court remind the states of
their role in the field of human rights. Thus,
in a 2001 judgment, the Court of Strasbourg
recalled “that the States have the capacity to
control if a movement or an association
continues, at allegedly religious ends, harmful
activities to the population or the public
safety.” In addition, in 2003, the Court
stressed “the role of the State as a neutral
and impartial organizer of the exercise of the
various religions, worships, and beliefs” and
stated “that this role contributes to ensure the
law and order, religious peace, and tolerance in
a democratic society.”
The European Union and
the European Parliament
In 1984,
the European Parliament examined motions for a
resolution aimed at addressing the illegal
activities of the Moonies. The resolution
Parliament adopted in May 1984 defined thirteen
criteria for use in the analysis of the
activities of the “organizations working under
cover of religious freedom”; these criteria
focused on the respect of various individual
rights, such as the education of children,
recruitment, financial requirements, and medical
care.
In 1996,
after the 1994 and 1995 mass murders and
suicides of members of the Solar Temple Order,
the Parliament adopted a resolution regarding
sects in Europe. This resolution requested in
particular that the member states not
automatically grant to groups the status of
religious organizations (which ensures tax
advantages and a certain legal protection), and
to consider the possibility of depriving sects
of this status if they are devoted to
clandestine or criminal activities,
These
resolutions always limit themselves to
recommendations to the member states, each of
which then has full power to decide on the
policy to be carried out.
Examples of National Policies
Regarding the Fight Against Sectarian Deviations
In the absence of a common
European policy aimed at sectarian deviations,
each member state defines its own policy
according to the perception of the sectarian
problem. That perception depends primarily upon
the relations between the state and one or more
established religions. In other words, on the
cultural and sociological levels, this
perception is generally conditioned by the
degree of separation between the respective
state and religion.
Vatican City
As a
state without a population except for its civil
servants—or, rather, a state whose population on
which it exerts its authority is located mainly
outside its territory—the Vatican is not a
European state. In this instance, the question
is not one of separation of church and state
because the state forms a part of the church,
and the Head of State of the Vatican is also the
head of the Roman Catholic Church. In his
function of supreme authority of a religion, the
Sovereign Pontiff should at least denounce the
sectarian deviations, starting with those
arising from within the Roman Catholic
community. In practice, however, the particular
statute of personal prelature given to Opus Dei
constitutes an opposite signal. In spite of
strong criticisms from many Roman Catholics
about the elitist and self-sufficient character
of the movement—for example, followers are
strongly encouraged to receive the sacraments
from the priests of Opus Dei—or the return to
medieval practices such as flagellation and the
wearing of the cilice, in 1992 the Vatican
proceeded to the beatification and, ten years
later, the canonization of the Opus Dei founder.
In addition to its privileged status, which
places Opus Dei under the direct authority of
the Pope, the organization relies on the
canonization of its founder to refute
criticisms. As far as Opus Dei is concerned,
priority is given to orthodoxy rather than to
orthopraxis. The very nature of the bonds
between Opus Dei and the Vatican, within which
there is no church-state separation, is at the
origin of the power stakes that motivate some
followers of Opus Dei. If all roads lead to
Rome, one surely is the direct way: El Camino.
The United Kingdom
The
United Kingdom presents the trait of having the
same person—the Queen—at the head of the civil
authorities, and of a mainstream religion with
the title of Supreme Governor of the Church of
England. Even if nowadays these functions are
mainly symbolic, they translate nevertheless to
a vision of a society that admits that a church
can be separated from the state. One can
consider that if the bond between the Crown and
the Church of England has remained until now, it
is precisely because of the rupture of the
nation’s dependence on Rome in 1534, which made
the Head of the State the “defender of the
faith,” fidei defensor. Nevertheless, the
status of state religion did not prevent the
development and coexistence of other religions
in England. If, for some English citizens,
joining a religion can be perceived as a public
matter, for others, doing so concerns only one’s
freedom of conscience. Is this distinction a
consequence of the great visibility of the
religious issue in the person of the Head of the
State? In any event, the United Kingdom is
characterized by an apprehension about
interfering with the individual choices of its
citizens. This characteristic is why Great
Britain has no specific policy in the field of
sectarian deviations.
However,
in 1999, a multisecular institution, the Charity
Commission, which plays a role in granting tax
advantages for recognized associations, decided
on the question of whether Scientology fit the
definition of a religion. The Commission did not
grant to Scientology the charitable
classification, stating that
Scientology is not a religion for the purposes
of English charity law. That religion for the
purposes of charity law constitutes belief in a
supreme being and worship of that being.
That it is accepted that Scientology believes in
a supreme being. However, the core practices of
Scientology, being auditing and training, do not
constitute worship as they do not display the
essential characteristic of reverence or
veneration for a supreme being.
Had the
Commission recognized a religious character to
Scientology, quod non, that recognition
would have boundaries. That a national authority
has recognized the religious character of a
group must be appreciated in its limited effect:
on the one hand, within the limits of
jurisdiction ratione loci and, on the
other hand, within limits of the determined
field—for example tax—in which this recognition
was granted.
To
answer the questions relating to the sectarian
phenomenon, British authorities, and in
particular the Home Office, rely on the
expertise of an NGO (nongovernmental
organization) recognized as a charity. This
authority is the Information Network Focus on
Religious Movements, or INFORM, which was
founded in 1988 by Professor Eileen Barker.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands was created
notably on the basis of a long national
tradition of religious tolerance. For centuries,
the Netherlands was a refuge and safe haven for
many people persecuted for their beliefs. The
nation’s tendency to privilege, private life,
and intimacy was remarkably illustrated by
generations of Dutch painters of the 17th and
18th centuries. Since 1983, the Constitution of
the Netherlands no longer mentions the
“religious communities,” even if, in practice,
some churches continue to receive public
subsidies. One can thus speak of an official
separation of the church and the state in the
Netherlands.
One base of Dutch society
is the model of the polders (de poldermodel).
According to this principle, when a problem
arises, a dialogue, in a spirit of tolerance,
must be established. Eventually, the problem
disappears. The authorities also apply this
principle with respect to the issue of cults.
One must go back to the
beginning of the 1980s to find a parliamentary
document that deals with these questions. In
1983 and 1984, a sub commission on cults of the
commission of the Public Health of the Second
Chamber of the States General—the House of
Representatives of the Dutch Parliament—issued a
report, “The Authorities and the New Religious
Movements.” This report was a
parliamentary document as well as a Ph.D. thesis
in law. The author, Tobias Witteveen, concludes
his research by saying
…in
general, new religious movements are no real
threat to mental public health. The relations
authorities—religion ... is dominated by two
principles; i.e., the separation of Church and
State and the freedom of religion. Both
principles are not absolute in the sense that on
the one hand there would be question of a strict
separation of Church and State and on the other
hand of an unlimited freedom to practice
religion.
With
regard to the freedom of religion, he adds,
“…nevertheless, an appeal to this basic right
cannot be a form of justification for any form
of conduct. Manifesting a religion is limited by
the general rule of law. Moreover, it can be
restricted by special rules.”
On the
basis of this assertion, one could have expected
that proposals for special rules would have been
put forward by the author, but this was not
Doctor Witteveen’s objective:
The
allegation that new religious movements use
coercion when recruiting and then subject
members to forms of conditioning has not been
confirmed by our study. ... No proof has come up
either that new religious movements would have a
serious pathogenic impact on their members...
Therefore, in our view, there is no call for
protective measures; e.g., regulation of
recruitment. Indeed, it would be difficult to
make such regulation compatible with the freedom
of religion. Neither is there much demand for
special information activities.
Did the
poldermodel influence the study of Mr. Witteveen, or did he conform to the social
consensus on new religious movements to achieve
his Ph.D.? These questions would be without
interest if the Witteveen report were just an
academic work, but it also guided the Dutch
authorities in their attitude toward sectarian
organizations—namely, the policy of having no
policy.
The French Republic
In
France, the Head of the State counts among his
responsibilities the defence of the founding
principles of the republic, the first of which
is laicity, or secularity. During 2005, which
commemorates the centenary of the “Law
concerning the separation of the Church and the
State,” many debates have demonstrated at which
point laicity (secularism) “à la française” was
a national specificity.
The law
of 1905 is the result of a process started in
1789, at the conclusion of the Ancien Regime,
which saw the end of the privileges of the
clergy and the nationalization of the estates of
the Catholic Church. After a period during which
the priests had to pronounce an oath of fidelity
to the civil authority, the Emperor Napoleon I
pacified the relations between the state and the
Catholic Church in 1801 by signing the
Concordat, the legal settlement that guaranteed
the freedom of worship. Afterward, France
experienced a century of anticlericalism
nourished in particular by the fact that the
Catholic Church maintained an important social
influence through the schools and the hospitals,
which it controlled. In 1905, the law on
secularity was essential to affirming that the
republic ensured the freedom of conscience and
recognized no religion (culte in French).
For the past century, the French political
community has dedicated itself to the defence of
the principle of secularity. The contemporary
approach of the French authorities with regard
to sectarian deviations is closely linked to
these historical events.
Since the Vivien report,
written at the request of the Prime Minister,
was issued in 1983, and through the presence of
the current Interdepartmental Mission of
Vigilance and Fight against the Sectarian
Deviations, or MIVILUDES, one observes a
determination of the French government to
protect its citizens and its institutions from
the activities of sectarian organizations. At
the political level, this policy has been
supported by parliamentary inquiries, one in
1995 and the other in 1999, which focused on
sects’ finances.
Following the Observatory
on Sects created in 1995 and the
Interdepartmental Mission of Fight against the
Sects, or MILS, chaired by Alain Vivien from
1998 to 2002, MIVILUDES, which depends on the
services of the Prime Minister, is in charge
“[of] observing and analysing the phenomenon of
the movements in sectarian matter whose actions
are menacing human rights and fundamental
freedoms or constitute a threat to public order
or are against the laws and regulation.”
Responsibility also falls on the Mission “to
inform the members of [the] public of the risks,
and if necessary the dangers, to which the
sectarian deviations expose him and to
facilitate the implementation of actions of
assistance to the victims of these deviations.”
The interdepartmental structure makes it
possible to reach all the government departments
and to make them aware of the issue of sectarian
deviations. the president of the Study Group on
Sects of the French National Assembly, the
socialist Deputy Philippe Vuilque, described the
difference in approach between MILS and
MIVILUDES in an interview: “…the Raffarin
government estimated that the former
interdepartmental Mission of [the] fight against
the sects (MILS) had done too much. It wished to
appease the debate and to standardize the
relations between the French government, the
authorities, and the sectarian organizations.”
In the
days before the end of the mandate of Mr.
Langlais as president of the MIVILUDES and the
resignation of the prime minister, the latter
addressed a circular to the ministers and
prefects that specified the action of the
government in the field of sectarian deviations:
The
action taken by the government is dictated by
the concern of reconciling the fight against the
actions of certain groups, which exploit
subjection, physical or psychological, in which
their members are placed in respect to public
freedoms and the principle of laicity. The
experiment showed that an approach that included
the authorities describing as “sect” [cult]
such-and-such group, and that basing their
action on this label alone would not make it
possible to ensure this conciliation effectively
and would not give a firm legal basis to the
initiatives taken. Also it was decided, rather
than to include certain groups in the index, to
exert a particular vigilance on any organization
that appears to exert a dangerous influence on
the personal freedom of its members, in order to
be ready to identify and repress any activity
likely to receive a criminal qualification or,
more generally, that seems contrary to the laws
and regulation.
Central and Eastern
European Countries
After
more than forty years of domination by regimes
inspired by soviet Marxism, several countries
rediscovered freedom in 1989. After having to
undergo oppression, persecutions, and the
repression of religious practice, several
countries of Eastern Europe—e.g., Romania and
Hungary— adopted very, even too, generous
legislation in the field of religious freedom.
These laws were inspired by the countries’ fear
of reproducing the former system or of being
accused of discrimination with regard to certain
groups. Several countries have thus established
simplified administrative procedures of
registration.
The registered organizations tend to take
advantage of this administrative situation to
affirm that they are a recognized religion.
Whatever the name given to these
procedures—e.g., recognition, registration—the
question remains: What follow-up and control of
these recognized or registered associations
exist? Is there a procedure for forfeiture or
withdrawal of the recognition or registration
and, if so, under what conditions? In the short
term, one can expect that countries that have
chosen a lax legislation will have to reinforce
their legal systems to counter the abuses that
inevitably will occur.
The Swiss
Confederation
In
Switzerland, religious issues do not belong to
the federal but rather to the cantonal level.
Therefore, the Swiss could not develop an
overall policy without the agreement of all the
twenty-six cantons. Nevertheless, four
cantons—Geneva, Vaud, Valais, Ticino—joined
together in 2001 to create a foundation whose
objective is to carry out research and to
provide information “on the beliefs” to the
public and the administrations. The federal
council supported this approach, but the
impossibility of creating a public institution
forced these cantons to create the private
foundation under control of the cantonal
authorities concerned. Article 2 of the statutes
of the Intercantonal Centre of Information on
Beliefs, or C.I.C., specifies the objective of
the Centre:
The
purpose of the foundation is, in particular with
the objective of prevention, to collect and
disseminate in an independent and neutral manner
information on the nature, the beliefs, and the
activities of religious, spiritual, or esoteric
groupings, the companies or organizations
depending on them, as well as sectarian
deviations.
Sectarian deviations are defined as “illicit
acts made in the name of or under cover of a
belief, whatever it is.”
The Kingdom of Belgium
Belgian
initiatives in the prevention of and fight
against the harmful sectarian organizations are
relatively recent. Indeed, it was after the
Parliamentary Inquiry Committee of 1996–1997 was
formed that a law was adopted in 1998 that
created an Information and Advice Centre on
harmful sectarian organizations. The same law
also instituted an administrative agency to
coordinate the fight against harmful sectarian
organizations. The origin of this law included
reassessing the concept of harmful sectarian
organization defined by the inquiry committee,
to determine the law’s field of application. The
term harmful sectarian organization
indicates “any group having or claiming to have
a philosophical or religious vocation, which, in
its organization or its practice, commits
illegal damaging activities, harms the
individuals or the society, or endangers human
dignity.” This definition was adopted again the
same year to define, among the competences of
the civilian intelligence agency, an activity
that does or could threaten the interior safety
of the state.
Only one
year after the adoption of the law, the Chamber
of Representatives appointed the first members
of the Information Centre. In September 2000,
the Centre became fully operational—for example,
by placing at the disposal of the public a
specialized library. Beyond this mission of
disseminating public information, the Centre,
defined by the law as an independent public
institution or non departmental public body, has
competency to provide advice for public
authorities. The first advice this organization
gave, at the request of the Foreign Minister,
was related to FECRIS. It has also given advice
in response to requests by magistrates. The law
imposes that the advice be made public except
when the Centre, by providing sufficient
argument, decides otherwise.
Toward a Common European
Policy on Sectarian Deviations
Even if the majority of
European states aim to guarantee to their
citizens freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, the means each state implements to
prevent and fight against the abuses committed
in the name or under cover of this freedom
differ significantly from one country to
another. In the quoted examples, one can note
the variations among information centres in
their public interventions: public subsidies of
a nongovernmental association in the United
Kingdom, the creation by the authorities of a
private foundation in Switzerland, an
independent Information centre instituted near a
ministry in Belgium, an interdepartmental
structure that depends on the Prime Minister in
France. By comparing these four institutions,
one finds certain common points. For three of
them, the commitment of a strong personality led
to the success of the institution: Professor
Barker for INFORM, the former Minister Vivien
for MILS, and the lawyer Bellanger for the C.I.C.
If one takes into account the independence of
the information centres, the British, Swiss, and
Belgian examples comply with recommendation 1412
of the parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe. Beyond these common points, the
essential difference lies in the statute that
distinguishes public institutions from private
initiatives. In spite of these differences, the
dialogue and a bilateral collaboration have been
established, and information is exchanged.
Occasional multilateral meetings make it
possible to share national experiences. One
cannot, however, speak about a common policy. In
his answer to a journalist’s question “Is there
a specific European project to fight against the
sects?” the French Deputy Philippe Vuilque
declared, “Europe does not make a big thing
against the sects. There is an embryo of
collective thought on the subject... But a true
common policy entirely remains to be conceived.”
The former president of the MIVILUDES,
Jean-Louis Langlais, answered the same question:
“No. It would be necessary to bring closer
philosophies, legal concepts, and administrative
systems very different from one country to
another. The French concept of ‘sectarian
deviations’ could be transposed.”
An
evolution toward the prevention of sectarian
deviations is indeed desirable because this
concept has the advantage of targeting the risk
of particular behaviours rather than pointing to
the groups themselves. Is it necessary to plead
for a common model or structure at the European
level? A priori, no, unless it were the
institution of a “European observatory on the
groups of a religious, esoteric, or spiritual
nature,” as the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe recommended in 1999.
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